The Peoples
Of The Hills.
Nine peoples are named together on a government list, as though they were one thing. They are not. They speak languages from three unrelated families, arrived across a span of centuries, and stand in nine different relationships to the gospel. This is what we have been able to learn about them, and where we are unsure we say so.
The NameA Word About The Word.
The Thai term is chao khao, usually translated into English as hill tribe. It appears on official documents, on the signs at tourist markets, and in a great deal of mission writing. It is also a word a good many of the people it describes would rather you did not use.
The objection is not fussiness. These are not tribes in any sense an anthropologist would recognise — several of them are larger than small European countries, with their own literatures and church conventions. And the Thai category was built for administration, not description: it marks these peoples as recent, peripheral, and not quite of the country, which for some of them is simply false. We use highland peoples, or hill peoples, and we use each people's own name wherever we know it.
One case shows how tangled this gets. The government's list of nine includes a people it calls H'Tin. Researchers working in Nan Province report that the people so labelled call themselves Lua, and that many of them find Htin insulting. But Lua is also the name used for a different people, Austroasiatic in a different branch, further west. So the official list manages to name one people by a term it rejects, and to use a single word for two peoples who are not the same. If the list feels tidy, that is the tidiness of a filing cabinet rather than of the hills.
We have kept the nine-group framing on this page because it is the frame our partners, the Thai authorities and every published figure use, and abandoning it would make the numbers impossible to compare. We do not think it is a good description of anybody.
The law has since moved, and not entirely in the direction the peoples themselves asked for. Thailand's Act on the Protection and Promotion of the Way of Life of Ethnic Groups came into force on 19 September 2025 — affirming non-discrimination, protecting language and tradition, providing for land rights in designated areas, and creating a representative council. But in January 2025 the House voted, 252 to 153, to strike the term indigenous peoples out of the Act. That was the term the movement itself had adopted and organised under. So the law now says ethnic groups, the state's older word for them, and the UN human rights office has urged Thailand to recognise indigenous peoples as a distinct category.
OriginsWhere They Came From.
There is a habit of speaking about these peoples as though they have always been up in the mountains, outside history. The opposite is nearer the truth. Most of them are the descendants of long migrations, and several arrived in what is now Thailand more recently than the United States has existed.
They divide into three language families that are not related to one another. The Karen speak Karenic languages, and are by a wide margin the largest of the nine. The Akha, Lahu and Lisu speak Tibeto-Burman languages of the Loloish branch and came down out of Yunnan and the Shan hills. The Hmong and the Mien speak Hmong-Mien languages and came from further north and east in China. And the Lua, Khmu and Htin speak Austroasiatic languages of the Mon-Khmer family — the oldest layer, related to Mon and Khmer rather than to anything else on the list.
The timing runs the other way from what most people assume. The Austroasiatic peoples were there first, long before the Thai. The Loloish and Hmong-Mien peoples arrived mostly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some of them within living memory of their grandparents. The Lisu are generally said to have entered northern Thailand only around 1920.
None of these people crossed a border, because for most of that period there was not one to cross in any sense they would have recognised. The line between Burma, Laos and Thailand was drawn by treaty and survey in the colonial era, and it was drawn across peoples rather than between them. A great deal of what came later — including the citizenship problem that still runs through these communities — follows from that.
The StateWhat Was Done To Them.
Through the twentieth century the Thai state took an increasing interest in the highlands, and the interest was rarely neutral. The category itself dates from 1959, when a welfare committee was renamed the Hill Tribe Welfare Committee — created not to describe these peoples but to administer them, in the wake of a national opium prohibition.
Opium is worth telling properly, because both the romantic and the moralising versions are wrong. Poppy suited the highlands for unglamorous reasons: a short cycle, a high return, no machinery or chemicals needed, and buyers who came to you — which mattered a great deal in places with no road, no title to the land, and often no citizenship. It was also medicine. In one study of over a thousand highland patients at a treatment centre, the most common route into addiction was illness, particularly abdominal pain, in communities with no clinic to go to.
The substitution effort that followed, much of it under royal patronage from 1969, is generally and rightly regarded as a success — production fell by something like 98 percent over forty years. Two honest qualifications belong with that. The guiding instruction was that the poppy should not be destroyed until something viable existed to replace it, which is why forced eradication largely waited until the 1980s; and the replacement crops did not simply out-compete opium on price. The Royal Project set floors and became a guaranteed buyer, and still pays above market for some substitute crops. One assessment prepared for the UN drug programme also identified something less obvious as a condition of success: granting citizenship. A man with legal status can hold land, and a man who can hold land will plant a coffee tree that takes years to bear. A man with neither plants what pays this season.
Forest and national-park law made highland communities into encroachers on land they had farmed for generations, sometimes overnight and by a stroke of a pen in Bangkok. Resettlement followed in places. So did schooling in Thai, which is the ordinary machinery by which a state makes a nation and also the ordinary machinery by which a language dies.
Christianity was not the only faith arriving in those villages, and it is dishonest to tell the story as though it were. From 1965 the Thammacarik programme sent Buddhist monks into highland communities and brought highland boys down to lowland temples, on a premise the scholar Charles Keyes summarised as the belief that to become Thai is to become Buddhist. Highland families choosing a religion in the second half of the twentieth century were choosing under pressure from more than one direction, and the pressure from the state ran towards the temple rather than the church.
The PapersThe Problem That Has Not Gone Away.
A large number of highland people in Thailand have no citizenship of any country. Not of Thailand, where they were born, and not of Burma or Laos or China, which they left generations ago.
The reasons are administrative rather than dramatic. A border was demarcated in 1904 across communities that were already there. Registration drives missed remote villages. A 1972 amendment to the Nationality Act tightened the rules in response to concerns about migration, and caught people who had been in the country for generations. Births in the hills often went unrecorded, and a person who cannot document where he was born has a hard time proving he belongs anywhere.
What follows from having no papers is not abstract. It restricts where a person may travel — historically to his own district, widened to his province only in 2016 — whether he may own land, whether he may work legally, and what schooling and healthcare he can reach. It is often said that statelessness makes a girl far more likely to be trafficked, and we want to put that carefully: specialists who work on statelessness say plainly that the causal link has never been decisively demonstrated with data. What the evidence does support is that having no legal status removes the lawful ways a family might absorb a sudden crisis — no legal work, no credit, no schooling — and it is that, rather than statelessness by itself, that leaves people exposed.
The numbers are contested and worth stating carefully. UNHCR's own statistical series records 612,524 people under its statelessness mandate in Thailand at the end of 2024, up from about 444,000 in 2015 — though its press releases in the same period speak of roughly half a million, because they are counting a different population. Around four in five live in border areas. Highland peoples are the majority, and how the burden falls varies enormously between them: one large survey of highland villages found about one in ten Khmu without citizenship against more than a quarter of Akha, more than a third of Lisu, and well over half of peoples who are not on the official list at all. Being recognised demonstrably helps.
There has been real movement. More than a hundred thousand people have acquired Thai nationality since 2008. On 29 October 2024 the cabinet approved a route to permanent residence for around 335,000 long-term residents and members of recognised ethnic minorities, and to nationality for more than 142,000 of their Thailand-born children, cutting a determination that had taken 270 days down to five. UNHCR's representative called it the most dramatic reduction of statelessness the world has ever seen.
It has not gone that way yet. On 30 June 2026 the cabinet extended the scheme by a further year, to June 2027, on the grounds that progress had been very limited — largely because many of the people it was written for have not come forward to apply. That is worth sitting with. A person who has spent a lifetime learning that presenting himself to officials goes badly does not necessarily believe the letter saying it will go well this time. Reform on paper and reform in a village are different distances.
The QuestionWhy The Gospel Took Root In The Hills.
Thailand is overwhelmingly Buddhist, and after two centuries of effort the Christian population of the country remains somewhere near one percent. Yet among several of the highland peoples, Christians are counted in the tens of thousands and in some places make up a third or more of the community. Something different has happened in the hills, and the obvious question is why.
Here is the disproportion in one line: roughly half of Thailand's Protestants are reckoned to come from the highland peoples, who are themselves well under five percent of the country's population.
The gap is measurable. One recent study comparing highland and lowland communities in the north found 43 percent of the hill-tribe participants identifying as Christian against 4 percent of the lowland Thai — a tenfold difference between neighbours, in the same provinces, at the same time.
Be careful how that gets stated, because it is easy to get wrong in both directions, and we managed both in earlier versions of this page. Nationally, Thailand's largest Christian body is the Catholic Church, and most Thai Catholics are lowland or of Chinese descent — so it is not true that most Thai Christians are highland people. But in the north the picture inverts completely. In the Diocese of Chiang Mai, church sources put the highland share of Catholics at somewhere between seventy and ninety-five percent, with most estimates near ninety; the bishop has given the breakdown as roughly sixty percent Karen and twenty percent Akha, with ethnic Thai about one in ten. When the Diocese of Chiang Rai was created in 2018 it was described as almost entirely tribal, and one priest working there observed that most of its villages are Akha and many of them are wholly Catholic. Both things are true at once, and either one on its own is misleading.
The honest answer is not that the missionaries who went to the hills were more gifted than the ones who stayed in the valleys. Several factors that had nothing to do with the messengers were already in place.
The first is prophecy. Several of these peoples — the Karen, the Lahu, the Lisu, and by recent scholarship the Akha as well — carried traditions of a lost book, given by a creator to their ancestors and somehow forfeited, together with an expectation that it would one day be brought back, sometimes explicitly by a white stranger. Missionaries arriving with a book walked into a story that had already been written for them. Among the Lahu and the Lisu this expectation was live and urgent, and in both cases it followed hard on uprisings that had been crushed.
The second is that lowland Thai identity is tightly bound to Buddhism in a way that highland identity was not bound to anything the Thai state recognised. To be Thai is, in ordinary usage, to be Buddhist; a Thai who converts is understood to have left something more than a religion. Highland peoples were outside that identity already. Conversion cost them less in national terms — though as the Akha case shows, it could cost them a great deal in local ones.
The third is the one this ministry keeps pointing at. Where the gospel moved fastest, it moved through the peoples themselves. Among the Akha, most of the pioneer evangelism was done not by Westerners but by Sgaw Karen Christians sent out by their own churches. Among the Lisu, J.O. Fraser — the missionary whose name is on the whole enterprise — wrote that the work was practically begun and has been almost wholly carried on by the Lisu themselves. The pattern is not a modern strategy. It is what actually happened.
One more piece of the picture belongs here, because it repeats a pattern. Catholic work in the northern hills is recent — the Paris Foreign Missions arrived in 1931, and the movement among the Karen dates from about 1951. What changed things was China: the Betharram fathers, expelled after 1949, came south into northern Thailand and found the reception there that they had lost behind them. The Protestant missions did the same thing in the same years, the China Inland Mission redeploying into Thailand from 1951 and Baptists coming across from Burma after its independence. A great deal of what happened in these hills in the second half of the twentieth century happened because doors closed somewhere else. Chiang Mai's Catholics numbered under six thousand in 1970. They are around fifty-six thousand now.
The PeoplesNine Peoples, One Range Of Mountains.
What follows is a short account of each of the nine, with the sources we relied on. They are not equally documented: the Karen, Lahu and Lisu have been studied for over a century, while for the Lua and the Htin the English-language record is comparatively thin. Where it is thin we have said so rather than filled the space.
Population figures deserve a warning. The Thai government, Ethnologue, academic surveys and mission agencies give materially different counts for the same people, sometimes differing by a factor of three. We give ranges. Anyone who quotes you a precise figure for how many Akha live in Thailand is quoting one source and not telling you which.
The KarenSgaw and Pwo · Karenic (Sino-Tibetan) · the largest of the nine
The Karen story is told in full elsewhere on this site, because it is the one we know best and the one that shaped how we work. In short: a people with an old tradition of a lost golden book received the gospel in the nineteenth century, largely through one of their own, a freed slave named Ko Tha Byu; built churches that governed and funded themselves from 1912; and kept growing after every foreign missionary was expelled from Burma in 1966.
On the Thai side the same instinct shows. The convention formed in 1955 with its centre in Chiang Mai, but the Bible institute came first, in 1953. Teach our own, lead our own — before anything else.
One correction belongs here, because it is the strongest thing in the record and it is usually left out. The Karen church in Thailand was not planted by American missionaries. It was planted by three unordained Burmese Karen lay evangelists who sailed from Rangoon on 12 December 1880 — and by a local man named Maung Htwe, whom the American Baptist leader Justus Vinton had ordered excluded as, in Vinton's words, too vile for description. Maung Htwe became their first convert in Thailand, and then held the young Lampang congregation together for twenty-five years while the ordained men were elsewhere. Vinton also wrote, in 1881, that native preachers should be used as the English government uses sepoys, under white officers. The church that exists today came from the men he wanted supervised, and from the convert he wanted shut out.
The Karen also appear in other peoples' stories on this page, and that is the part most accounts leave out. Karen evangelists carried the gospel to the Akha. A Karen evangelist helped devise the script the Lisu still read. When a Western mission history says the gospel reached these hills, it usually means a Karen walked there.
One more thing the summaries flatten. The Karen are not one people religiously. A 1977 government survey found 18.3 percent of Sgaw Karen Christian against 1.7 percent of Pwo Karen — a tenfold difference inside what outsiders call one group, with the Pwo overwhelmingly Buddhist. Those figures are nearly fifty years old and current mission estimates put both higher, but the gap between the two has not closed. When you read that the Karen are a Christian people, it is the Sgaw who are mostly meant.
The Hmongalso called Meo or Miao, both now widely rejected · Hmong-Mien
The Hmong are among the largest of the nine and the one whose history is most often flattened. Their traditions place their origin far north in China, and their long movement south was driven in large part by conflict with expanding Chinese imperial power.
But there is no single Hmong story in Thailand. There are at least three, and they point in opposite directions.
The first are the oldest: Hmong who came south from China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the same movement that brought the other Loloish and Hmong-Mien peoples down the ridges. They were here for generations before anything that follows.
The second came out of the war next door. The Hmong of Laos were recruited in large numbers by the CIA from the early 1960s — nine thousand by 1961, perhaps forty thousand at the height of it, with the average recruit in the last years aged around fifteen. When Laos fell in 1975 the leadership was flown out and most of the men who had fought were not. What followed was one of the larger refugee movements of the era: something well over a hundred thousand Hmong crossed into Thailand between 1975 and the early 1990s. The largest camp, Ban Vinai in Loei Province, held around forty-five thousand people at its peak in the mid-1980s, and a quarter of the people in it had been born there. It closed at the end of 1992.
The third is the one almost nobody outside Thailand knows, and it cuts directly against the second. Through the same years, Thai Hmong joined the Communist Party of Thailand in significant numbers and fought the Thai state — the state that was hosting the Lao Hmong refugees who had fought communism. Fighting began in 1967 in Chiang Rai and Tak. They were labelled Red Meo, and after the amnesties many remained marginalised and without full rights to their land. Khek Noi in Phetchabun, now the largest Hmong community in the country, was substantially settled by former CPT fighters.
Hold those two side by side. Within one ethnic name, in one decade, Hmong men were fighting for the CIA against communism in Laos and for the communist party against the government of Thailand — and some of both ended up in the same province. Anyone who writes about the Hmong as a single actor with a single politics has not looked.
The end of the refugee story is recent and hard. In December 2009 Thailand forcibly returned roughly four and a half thousand Hmong to Laos, among them a hundred and fifty-eight people whom UNHCR had formally recognised as refugees and whom four countries had already agreed to accept. Journalists and independent observers were kept away. Access to the returnees afterwards was largely refused.
On Christianity: the significant early movement was in Laos, not Thailand — the Christian and Missionary Alliance reached the Plain of Jars in 1949, and by 1955 counted around 5,500 converts across 96 villages, roughly seventy percent of them Hmong. The written Hmong script most widely used today came out of that period, devised between 1951 and 1953 by two Protestant missionaries working with a Catholic priest. In Thailand the Christian share is smaller, and we will not give you a number: no representative survey of Hmong religious affiliation exists, and the figures in circulation trace to undated estimates. One honest note from the literature — the largest documented expansion of Hmong churches came mostly through people transferring in from the camps and through children being born, rather than through conversion.
And one turn in the story that runs the opposite way to the usual telling. The Hmong district of the Church of Christ in Thailand traces its founding not to foreign missionaries but to Hmong Christians from the United States, who began evangelising in Thailand from 1987 — people whose families had left as refugees a decade earlier, coming back to their own. Send a people away and some of them return as the mission.
The MienIu Mien, also called Yao · Hmong-Mien
The Mien are the most surprising of the nine to anyone expecting undifferentiated animism. They carry a written religious tradition derived from medieval Chinese Taoism, with ritual texts in Chinese characters and a priesthood able to read them. A people frequently described in tourist literature as a colourful hill tribe has in fact been a literate religious community for centuries.
That matters for how the gospel meets them, and there is a documented moment that shows it exactly. Around 1907, in Nan Province, missionaries reached a Mien village with Christian literature printed in Chinese characters — and the villagers were drawn in precisely because they could read it. Here was a book in a script their own priests used. The conversation ended when the missionaries required that the ancestor altars be burned. A Mien household considering Christianity was never choosing between a book and no book. It was being asked to set one textual tradition against another that its own ancestors had kept for centuries.
Their migration is unusually well dated. Mien in the Nan and Chiang Kham area are recorded as having left Guangdong around 1860 and settled in Nan by about 1880 — a journey of some twenty years across two countries.
The AkhaLoloish (Tibeto-Burman) · counted within the Hani in China
The Akha are usually described as the most resistant of these peoples to the gospel, and for the first sixty years that was true. Baptist contact in Burma began in 1907; the first Akha Baptist church was not founded until 1936. In Thailand missionaries arrived in the mid-1950s and the first Akha believers came only around 1962.
The reason is worth understanding, because it is not stubbornness. Akhazang is usually translated 'the Akha Way', and anthropologists insist it is not a religion in the sense of something believed. It is something carried, the way a load is carried — a whole system of genealogy recited back through dozens of generations, village priest, spirit gates renewed each year, offerings to ancestors, and the customs that make a person Akha. To stop carrying it was not to change opinion. It was to stop being Akha, and to lose the right to live in the village. Individual conversion, in that setting, was close to structurally impossible.
Two corrections to the usual telling. First, most of the pioneer evangelism among the Akha was done by Sgaw Karen Christians sent by their own churches, not by Westerners. Second, the picture has changed: Akha churches grew from roughly 16,000 members to 27,000 between 2009 and 2018, and one careful irony from the research is that the very ritual obligations which once made conversion unthinkable are now among the reasons Akha families give for converting.
Be careful with figures here, and we would rather show you the disagreement than hide it. A 2017 survey of church rolls counted about 214 churches and 27,000 members, which is roughly a third of the Thai Akha. A peer-reviewed study of Akha young people in Chiang Rai found two thirds identifying as Christian — though young people are not the whole community, and that questionnaire gave no option for the traditional religion. One widely used mission database says ninety percent. The honest answer is that Akha Christianity is substantial and growing and that nobody has counted it properly.
The LahuLoloish (Tibeto-Burman) · Muhsur in older Thai sources
Here is a fact that most published accounts get wrong, and it belongs to Thailand. The standard story is that the first Lahu Christians were converted by the American Baptist missionary William Marcus Young at Kengtung in Burma, around 1903 to 1905. It is not so. In February 1891, the Presbyterian Daniel McGilvary baptised two Lahu men at Mae Kon, some sixteen kilometres from Chiang Rai — thirteen years earlier, and on this side of the border. Both men were outcasts, expelled from their previous village on an accusation of witchcraft. The following year, thirteen more adults and seven children were baptised.
That first community did not last; it disappears from the record after about 1920, and the historians who have looked are not certain why. But the correction stands, and it has been accepted in the scholarly literature.
What happened at Kengtung afterwards was of a different scale. In 1903, weeks after a Lahu uprising across the Chinese border had been crushed, Lahu came to Young reporting dreams that followed the death of their own holy man, who had foretold a saviour appearing as a white foreigner. Hundreds were baptised in 1904, and a contemporary reference work records over two thousand in 1905. A joint Presbyterian-Baptist commission of the period noted that many Lahu took Young himself to be Jesus and called him by that name — a detail that ought to complicate any triumphant telling.
One further caution about the Lahu. Anthropologists who have studied G'ui sha, the Lahu creator god that missionaries were so encouraged to find, conclude that his prominence is relatively recent and traceable to a Buddhist movement through the Yunnan hills in the late eighteenth century. The 'traditional' high god the missionaries met had a history of his own.
A word on the numbers, because this is where accounts of the Lahu go wrong most often. Anthony Walker, who has spent a career on these people, wrote in 2016 that Protestant Lahu make up about a third of all Lahu living in Thailand. Health surveys among Lahu villagers in Chiang Rai have returned higher figures still, in the region of a half, though those are samples rather than counts and their questionnaires often offer no option for the traditional religion, which pushes people into other boxes. One widely used mission database, meanwhile, reports one Lahu sub-group as ninety-nine percent Christian and another as one fifth of one percent. Take a third as the working figure and treat anything more precise with suspicion.
The LisuLoloish (Tibeto-Burman) · the most egalitarian of the nine
The Lisu carry the most famous missionary story in these hills, and also the one most in need of correction. J.O. Fraser of the China Inland Mission reached Tengyue around 1909 and spent five fruitless years among Han Chinese, a period in which by his biographer's account he contemplated taking his own life. Then the Lisu came down from the mountains.
They had a story of their own: words from the Mother-God written on deerskin and eaten by a dog, and a prophecy that a white Lisu king would come from a far country bringing books in the Lisu language. A convert carried Fraser's photograph, in Lisu dress, from village to village. One of Fraser's colleagues observed drily that his white-man appearance so monopolised interest that no one remembered his message.
You will read that Fraser baptised sixty thousand Lisu in 1916 and 1917. He did not. The claim traces to an unsigned mission blog and is contradicted by every other source, including mission ones: the first Lisu baptism was in 1915, six hundred were baptised by 1918, and one district counted around two thousand communicant members by 1927. The real growth came later and largely through Lisu evangelists. Fraser's own verdict was that the work was practically begun and has been almost wholly carried on by the Lisu themselves. We repeat the correction because a hundredfold exaggeration in favour of a Western missionary is precisely the kind of story this ministry exists to stop telling.
The script, which the Lisu still use, was devised with a Karen evangelist named Sara Ba Thaw and refined by Fraser, somewhere between 1914 and 1920. The New Testament followed in 1938, the whole Bible in 1968, and China gave the script official recognition in 1992.
And then the part that ought to sober anyone. Almost none of that happened in Thailand. The Lisu who came south around 1920 were largely untouched by the movement across the border. Work began in 1951; a missionary named Lilian Hamer was murdered near Chiang Mai in April 1959; the first Thai Lisu baptisms came in 1970. There is no reliable count of Lisu Christians in Thailand today, and by every estimate the great majority still follow the traditional religion. The Lisu are, in the same century and among the same people, both one of the largest movements to Christ in Asia and an unreached people.
The LuaLawa · Austroasiatic (Mon-Khmer) · among the oldest inhabitants
The Lua are usually introduced as the old ones, in these hills before the Tai came down into the valleys. That is very likely true in substance, and it is worth being careful about how much weight it will bear.
What is certain is that the Chiang Mai and Lamphun basin was settled long before any Tai kingdom. What is not established is an unbroken ethnic line from those settlements to the people called Lawa today — the archaeologists who excavated the key sites never use the word, and the northern Thai chronicles asserting Lawa priority were written seven or eight centuries after the events they describe. A history that leans on those chronicles is leaning on something written far closer to our time than to the events.
The stronger evidence is not in the ground but in the ritual life of Chiang Mai itself. The city's own ceremonies acknowledge the Lawa as prior: the Pu Sae Ña Sae rite propitiates what are described as the ancestor spirits of the aboriginal Lawa, and the inthakhin city pillar carries the same acknowledgement. A conquering court does not usually invent a debt to somebody else's ancestors. When the city that displaced them still makes offerings in their name, that is a claim to priority written into the calendar rather than into a chronicle.
On Christianity among the Lua we know little, and the little in circulation should be handled with tongs. One widely used mission database credits Lawa Christians to the Baptist missionary William Young in the 1920s; Young worked among the Lahu, Shan and Wa in Burma and China, and the field record dates mission among the Lawa considerably later. The error looks like Wa material attached to the Lawa because the two languages are close relatives. We would rather record that we do not know than repeat it.
The KhmuKhamu, Kammu · Austroasiatic (Khmuic) · once called Kha, a word meaning slave
The Khmu are one of the major peoples of Laos — around 700,000, the country's largest ethnic minority — and one of the smaller of the nine in Thailand. Most of what has been written about them was written about somewhere else, which is part of why they are easy to overlook here.
They belong to the oldest layer. Khmuic speakers are held to be among the earliest inhabitants of mainland Southeast Asia, occupying a far larger area before Tai-speaking peoples moved into the lowlands. And as with the Lawa at Chiang Mai, the clearest evidence of that priority is ritual rather than archaeological: the Lao regarded the Khmu as the original inhabitants with authority over the local spirits, and the court at Luang Prabang used Khmu in exactly that capacity — as did the old principality of Nan. The kingdoms that subordinated them still needed them to address the land.
Their own name for themselves means, simply, person. The word outsiders used for centuries — Kha — means slave.
How they came to Thailand is unusually well documented, and it is not a story of migration so much as of labour. From about 1880, European teak firms wanted forest workers, and young Khmu men came down from Laos to get them: an estimated three to four hundred entering Chiang Mai every year at the height of it, in groups of fifteen to thirty, averaging around seventeen years old. They were recruited by other Khmu, and they came for a reason worth understanding — to earn a brideprice, and beyond that to become men wealthy enough to make the proper sacrifices to their ancestors. The work in the teak forests was in service of the spirits back home.
A third movement came later and matters legally. Many Khmu in Thailand today arrived fleeing the war and what followed it after 1975 — and a Khmu who crossed after 1975 fell under refugee and immigration policy rather than the hill-tribe programme, even though his ethnicity was on the official list. One people, one name, two entirely different legal situations.
On Christianity the honest summary is that the largest Khmu response happened in Laos, not here. The Presbyterian Daniel McGilvary found an opening among Khmu labourers at Muang Sai in 1897, and French colonial policy closed it by 1903; he recorded plainly that of some three thousand converts in his mission, barely half a dozen were Khmu. The work that grew came later and through the Christian and Missionary Alliance in northern Laos. In Thailand the Khmu work in Nan Province is Mennonite Brethren, beginning in 1991. There are Scripture portions in Khmu, first published in 1918 — and no New Testament and no complete Bible in the language to this day.
The HtinMal and Prai · Austroasiatic (Mon-Khmer) · a people who reject this name
This entry carries the name the Thai government uses, and the government's name is one the people reject. Researchers working in Nan Province report that those officially listed as Htin identify themselves as Lua, and that many of them consider Htin an insult. Mal and Prai, the two main varieties of their language, are sometimes used instead.
We have kept the official heading so that the nine on this page match the nine on every list you will encounter, and we have said in the entry itself what the people would rather be called. If that seems like an awkward compromise, it is, and the awkwardness belongs to the list rather than to them.
As with the Lua and the Khmu, the documentation available to us in English is thin, and we would rather leave the space visibly empty than fill it with inference.
The LineThe Hills, Year By Year.
A NoteOn Sources And Honesty.
This page is a summary of other people's work, not original field research, and we think you should know which is which.
Where a claim rests on peer-reviewed scholarship we have leaned on it. Where it rests on a mission agency's own reporting we have said so, because mission figures are self-reported and the incentive runs towards optimism. Where sources disagree we have given the range instead of picking a winner.
On the numbers generally, we will let somebody better placed than us say it. The foundation that produced the most widely cited statistics on Protestant churches in Thailand has now stopped counting Christians altogether, and explained why: they no longer attempt it because the figure is known only to God, and because the methods for arriving at one are so inconsistent that the effort is unreliable. They count what can be seen instead — where the churches are, how many people come on a Sunday, and which villages still have nothing. We have tried to write this page in that spirit. Where a number here looks precise, it is probably somebody's estimate wearing a suit.
We have deliberately excluded two widely repeated claims. The first is that J.O. Fraser baptised sixty thousand Lisu in 1916 and 1917; the documented figure is six hundred by 1918, and the larger number appears to originate in an unsourced mission blog. The second is that William Marcus Young converted the first Lahu Christians; the Presbyterian archives at Payap University show that Daniel McGilvary baptised two Lahu men near Chiang Rai in 1891.
We have also left gaps visible. For the Lua and the Htin we found little reliable English-language material specific to Thailand, and we have said so in each entry rather than writing around it. An earlier version of this page said the same of the Khmu; that was a failure of our searching rather than of the record, and the entry has since been rewritten from Frank LeBar's fieldwork and Daniel McGilvary's own account. If you can correct or extend anything here, particularly from these communities themselves, please write to us at info@endsinitiative.org. We would rather be corrected than be confidently wrong about somebody's grandparents.
Where We Come InA Late Chapter In A Long Story.
Set the nine side by side and the range is startling. The Karen have had churches for the better part of two centuries and have been sending their own missionaries since 1912. The Akha, resistant for sixty years, now count roughly a third of their number in Thailand as Christian. And the Lisu — one of the great movements to Christ in modern Asia on one side of a border — remain, on the Thai side of that same border, largely unreached.
That is the situation our partners work in. Not a blank map waiting for outsiders, and not a finished work either. Churches that have governed themselves longer than most American denominations have existed, standing a day's walk from villages where nobody has heard anything at all.
It sets the terms for how a group like ours can honestly come. You do not arrive over the top of a church that was self-governing before your grandfather was born. You come under it, at its invitation, and you help it reach the valleys it cannot yet reach alone. When the gospel has moved fastest in these hills it has moved through Karen evangelists, Lisu families, and Akha believers going to their own — and the Westerners who did the most lasting good were mostly the ones who knew that and said so.
We are a late chapter in this. We are glad to be any chapter at all.